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1. Introduction 
The most recent financial crisis triggered tectonic shifts in the economic, social and political 
landscape, particularly in the European Union (EU). Countries like Greece, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, 
and Spain experienced a sudden hike in their sovereign bond spreads, reflecting the market‟s 
perception of increased economic, financial and political risk (Fischer and Dötz, 2010). Other EU 
countries such as Germany saw their bond spreads reach historic lows coupled with a strong 
economic outlook (Attinasi et al., 2009). In the press, this divergence during the crisis prompted a 
number of headlines implying fires-sales from the more crisis-stricken countries to Germany and 
other EU countries that were less affected by the crisis. Under the header “German companies are 
hunting for bargains in Greece” The Wall Street Journal announced that “Greece is for sale - cheap - 
and Germany is buying”, referring to acquirors such as Deutsche Telekom AG and Fraport AG 
(Lawton and Stevens, 2011). In a similar vein, The Guardian claims that “Greece embarks on a fire-
sale” to, inter alia, “the EU's powerhouse, Germany” (Smith, 2012) and also reports of Portuguese 
assets being sold to Swiss and French companies (Tremlett, 2012). In front of this backdrop we 
investigate how the financial crisis affected the selling and buying of corporate assets between EU 
countries. Particularly, we test Krugman‟s (2000) „fire-sale FDI‟ hypothesis that describes a surge in 
foreign acquisitions of target firms from crisis countries during a financial crisis. According to this 
notion, firms from crisis countries are sold at prices below their fundamental value to firms from 
countries that are less affected by the crisis. Only few studies on FDI have focused on 
macroeconomic shocks explicitly and they primarily investigated the 1997-1998 East Asian 
financial crisis (Acharya et al., 2010; Aguiar and Gopinath, 2005; Krugman, 2000), the 1995 Latin 
American financial crisis (Krugman, 2000), and banking and currency crises before 2007 in 
emerging markets (Alquist et al., 2013).  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on fire-sale FDI that focuses on the latest 
financial crisis and on Europe. The EU lends itself to a study of determinants of foreign direct 
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investment (FDI) and cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A)
1
 before and during the last 
financial crisis, as economic differences between countries widened, whereas the institutional 
environments of these countries, including merger regulation, rather converged.
2
 The latter is of 
importance as differences in corporate and public governance have been shown to play a crucial 
role in FDI and cross-border M&A (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Weitzel and Berns, 2006; Bris and 
Cabolis, 2008; Bris et al., 2008; Chari et al., 2010). Hence, by focusing on mergers within the EU, 
we hope to reduce confounding effects of heterogeneity in merger regulation and related aspects of 
governance, and to increase the tractability of our analysis. Another reason to focus on the EU is 
that several important policy questions in the EU, ranging from a more integrated financial market 
to the desirability of more intra-European FDI, hinge crucially on the existence of fire-sale FDI 
during the financial crisis (e.g., Coeurdacier et al., 2009). We focus on fire-sale FDI and three of its 
key implications: (i) more cross-border sales of corporate assets from countries that were hit hardest 
in the crisis, (ii) lower prices for corporate assets in crisis countries, and (iii) more cross-border 
sales and lower prices when credit conditions tighten and macroeconomic conditions deteriorate.  
Establishing evidence of fire sales in European crisis countries is challenging. First, we have 
to identify whether fire-sale prices of corporate assets are below their fundamental value. It is 
difficult, if not impossible, to predict fair values of corporate assets under normal conditions, let 
alone during a financial crisis. We sidestep this issue by comparing the prices of corporate assets 
from crisis countries that are sold during the crisis with prices before the crisis and with prices from 
non-crisis countries. Second, FDI in Europe during the past 20 years clustered over time due to two 
merger waves, which can represent up to 80% of global FDI flows (Stiebale and Reize, 2011). A 
surge in FDI in crisis countries may seem considerable in relation to pre-crisis levels of the same 
country, but it may not be significant when viewed against the overall increase of merger activity in 
Europe. We tackle this issue by „de-cycling‟ country-specific cross-border activity with the 
                                                 
1 Although technically inaccurate, we use the terms „merger‟, „acquisition‟, „takeover‟ and „M&A‟ synonymously. 
2
 The effectiveness of EU merger regulation has increased significantly over the period 1990-2002 (Duso et al., 2011). 
Moreover, the change in merger legislation in 2004 also improved both the predictability and accuracy of the 
decisions by the Directorate-General for Competition (Duso et al., 2013). 
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European merger cycle. Finally, the match between home and host countries in cross-border 
mergers is not random. Particularly during the crisis, many country-pair combinations of acquirors 
and targets may be avoided consistently. Hence, if we analyze observed FDI flows at face value, we 
run the risk of a selection bias. To correct for this potential bias, we use a Heckman approach that 
first estimates the propensity of an acquiror country to be part of the sample, before considering the 
determinants for selecting target countries. 
We analyze a large panel of corporate transactions in 27 EU countries from 1999 to 2012. 
The cross-section and the time line of the sample permits us to compare cross-border transactions in 
crisis countries with non-crisis countries both before and during the crisis. As mentioned above, we 
focus on three distinct implications of fire sales. We start with the question whether cross-border 
sales of corporate assets from the crisis countries Greece, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, and Spain increase 
in the crisis. Despite some weak indications for more sales to foreign firms, we do not reliably 
detect a higher share of cross-border merger activity in these countries, neither over the whole 
sampling period, nor in the crisis period. We find that cross-border activity generally declines in the 
crisis, which also applies to crisis countries. We then reconsider our definition of crisis countries 
and use sovereign risk measurements, macroeconomic demand conditions and credit conditions to 
identify countries in distress. Here, we do find evidence consistent with the fire-sale hypothesis for 
countries with higher default risk and lower economic demand during the crisis. However, for 
countries with lower domestic credit, which provide the most important „test bed‟ for the fire-sale 
hypothesis, the results are in conflict with the notion of a sell-out of corporate assets in times of a 
liquidity shortage. To assess whether corporate assets are traded at a discount, we investigate the 
premiums paid for targets. Our results show that premiums are generally lower in crisis countries, 
but they do not decline during the crisis. When using sovereign risk measurements, macroeconomic 
demand conditions, and credit conditions, we find evidence for depressed prices if access to credit 
is low in the target country. This effect, however, is not stronger in the crisis period, which, again, is 
not consistent with fire-sale FDI. Taken together, we find little evidence for the view that crisis 
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countries fire-sale their assets to other countries in the EU, as sometimes expressed in the business 
press. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents previous studies and their main results 
in relation to this study. Section 3 and 4 describe the sample, methodological challenges, and the 
variables. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical and empirical background 
The empirical FDI literature that investigates the effects of financial crises is still young and 
scattered. Krugman (2000) was first to notice that the capital flight out of East Asian countries 
during the 1997-1998 crisis was coupled with a substantial increase of inward FDI. He observes a 
similar pattern in Mexico and Argentina during the Latin American crisis of 1995. Krugman (2000) 
suggests that corporate assets in crisis countries are sold to foreign investors at discounted prices 
due to tightening credit conditions and a rapid deterioration in macroeconomic stability.
3
 He also 
coined the term 'fire-sale FDI' for this phenomenon. 
However, it is not a given that lower prices in target countries trigger FDI inflows. In 
efficient capital markets target discounts should only compensate for the higher risk that acquirors 
have to take in times of crisis.
4
 The fire-sale hypothesis therefore critically depends on the 
assumption of some (temporary) capital market frictions, such as unduly tight credit conditions, 
which were very prominent in the East Asian financial crisis (Krugman, 2000). In the absence of 
such credit constraints in the target‟s domestic capital market, target prices may be low, but do not 
necessarily reflect undervaluation after risk-adjustment. Baker et al. (2009) therefore theoretically 
distinguish two capital market related motivations for FDI flows. Under the fire-sale hypothesis, 
“FDI flows reflect the purchase of undervalued host-country assets” (p.339). Here, as in Krugman 
(2000), undervaluation is the underlying factor that pulls FDI into a country. This stands in contrast 
                                                 
3
 Krugman (2000) cites anecdotal evidence from the financial media, which often expresses this idea, especially in the 
context of financial crises. His approach is related to earlier work from Shleifer and Vishny (1992). 
4
 Acquirors may, for example, be exposed to higher domestic economic and/or political risk, or face higher liquidity risk 
in the financing or possible re-selling the asset (if the deal turns sour). 
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to the „cheap financial capital‟ hypothesis, where “FDI flows are an opportunistic use of the 
relatively low-cost financial capital available to overvalued source-country firms” (p.338). Here, 
„cheap capital‟ is the underlying factor that pushes FDI into a target country. Baker et al. (2009) also 
refer to this view as 'cross-border capital arbitrage by multinationals', where acquirors with 
relatively easy access to financial capital seek to invest their cheap capital in target countries with 
relatively higher domestic cost of capital. Both the fire-sale hypotheses and the cheap financial 
capital hypothesis assume market imperfections in the target‟s or the acquiror‟s country, 
respectively. Hence, in the European crisis, three scenarios are possible. First, if credit constraints in 
crisis countries dominate, we should observe fire-sale FDI. Second, if lower capital costs in non-
crisis countries dominate, we should observe cross-border capital arbitrage by multinationals. Third, 
if the European capital market provides a sufficient integration of both the target and acquirer 
market, we should not observe any crisis effects in FDI. In this paper we are primarily interested in 
the first of the three scenarios, but discuss the implications of our results for the other two scenarios 
(see conclusion). 
Empirically, Baker et al. (2009) limit a direct comparison of the fire-sale and the cheap 
financial capital hypotheses to a preliminary analysis of FDI data (1975-2001) in which they find 
that FDI flows are positively related (unrelated) to the average market-to-book ratios of the acquiror 
(target) countries, consistent with the cheap financial capital hypothesis and contrary to the fire-sale 
hypothesis. In their sample, one of the countries involved is always the US. This makes it difficult 
to apply their findings to the EU, which is the focus of our paper. Moreover, as the authors‟ primary 
focus is on mispricing, they do not explicitly analyze the effects of financial crises. 
Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) provide first large-scale empirical evidence for fire-sale FDI 
and M&As during a financial crisis. Despite a decrease in domestic M&A activity, they find a 92% 
increase of FDI into East Asia during the 1997-1998 crisis. Particularly companies with liquidity 
constraints have been purchased, which supports the notion of fire-sales. Acharya et al. (2010) 
develop a theoretical model and provide empirical tests, which show a similar pattern of increased 
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inbound FDI and foreign ownership as in Aguiar and Gopinath (2005). In contrast to this paper, 
both studies focus on the East Asian crisis. 
Alquist et al. (2013) use M&A data from the Thomson Reuters SDC database (1990-2007) 
to analyze fire-sale FDI in 16 emerging economies during banking crises. They analyze several 
aspects of foreign acquisitions, including the percentage, duration and reselling rate of foreign 
holdings, the role of external finance and of the identity of foreign buyers. Similar to our results, the 
authors find little evidence for fire-sale FDI in a crisis when compared to non-crisis levels. They 
conclude that “contrary to the conventional wisdom, fire-sale FDI (...) seem to be „business as 
usual‟ rather than characteristic features of FDI undertaken during financial crises in emerging 
market economies” (p.20). However, Alquist et al. (2013) focus on emerging markets, which makes 
it difficult to apply this conclusion to the European crisis. 
We add to this literature by focusing on Europe and on the most recent financial crisis. 
Moreover, methodologically, we correct for a possible sample selection bias using a Heckman 
procedure and for the clustering of FDI over time due to merger waves. As a more general 
contribution, the paper also adds to our understanding of cross-border M&As, particularly in 
Europe.  
 
3. Sampling and methodology 
3.1 Sampling 
In line with previous studies on fire-sales FDI (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2005; Alquist et al., 2013), we 
focus on M&As rather than all forms of FDI, which would include greenfield investments. The 
latter is, by definition, not an acquisition of existing businesses and thereby does not lend itself to 
the purchase or sale of targets in a fire-sale operation.
5
 M&As play a predominant role in FDI. 
Stiebale and Reize (2011: 155) contend that “cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
                                                 
5
 We acknowledge that the term 'fire-sale FDI' is misleading as FDI includes greenfield as a mode of entry. The 
pertinent literature, however, refers to 'fire-sale FDI' (and not „fire-sale M&A‟) since the term was first coined by 
Krugman (2000). 
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constitute a large share of global FDI flows reaching 80% in the years of merger waves”. 
 We employ the Thomson Reuters SDC database to identify M&As. The study considers 
deals announced from January 1999 to December 2012. We chose 1999 as starting date, as it marks 
the introduction of the Euro in several EU countries. We only include M&As involving acquiror and 
target countries from the 27 EU member states (as of 2012). As explained in the introduction we 
focus on mergers within the EU to reduce confounding effects of institutional heterogeneity, 
particularly with regard to merger regulations, and to be able to address important EU policy 
questions that pertain to intra-European FDI (e.g., Coeurdacier et al., 2009). The sample excludes 
financials, utilities, or government agencies due to differences in reporting and market regulation 
(as in, e.g., Erel et al. 2012). We exclude LBOs, spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tenders, exchange 
offers, and repurchases of own shares. Our final sample includes 76,479 M&As, out of which 
19,024 are cross-border deals representing 24.9% of all transactions. An inspection of the sample 
reveals two methodological challenges. 
 
3.2 Methodological challenge #1: Potential selection bias 
Table 1 shows the number of mergers per country pair over the entire investigation period. The first 
column denotes the acquiror country and the first row the target country. The columns „Total‟ and 
„Total (%)‟ report the number of all cross-border mergers per acquiror or target country and their 
fraction of all inbound or outbound mergers in percent. Note that many of the countries that 
experienced severe problems during the financial crisis, i.e. Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal and 
Spain (Beetsma et al., 2013; Kalbaska and Gatkowski, 2012), are net providers of targets. Spain was 
a target in 6.9% of all cross-border mergers, but an acquiror in only 3.5%. Portugal was also twice 
as often a target than an acquiror country (1.7% v 0.8%, respectively). Italy was a target in 5.7% of 
all inbound mergers, but an acquiror in only 5%. In contrast, many countries that did not get into 
difficulties in the sovereign debt markets (Beetsma et al., 2013) are net providers of acquirors. 
Dutch firms, for example, were acquirors in 10.1% of all cases, but targets in only 7%. Similar 
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ratios also apply to Sweden, the UK, and France, with 9.4% v 6.3%, 15.4% v 12.9%, and 12.8% v 
10.5%, respectively. 
=== INCLUDE TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE === 
 All countries have at least once been an acquiror and also a target in a cross-border merger. 
Malta provides the fewest targets to foreign investors (15), while acquirors from Bulgaria are the 
least active abroad (7). The UK is the most active cross-border acquiror (2931) and provides most 
targets, too (2453). The large variation of merger cases per country overweighs merger-active 
countries in simple cross-sectional estimations with individual mergers as the unit of observation. 
We therefore follow Erel et al. (2012) and aggregate all mergers between two countries into an 
ordered country-pair panel. Thus, the unit of observation is one cell of Table 1, one for each quarter 
in the sample period from 1999 to 2012. Note that UK-France and France-UK are two ordered 
country pairs, reflecting different bilateral flows between the two countries. Furthermore, we 
correct for clustering at the country-pair level in all estimations. 
 Table 1 also shows that many country-pairs did not have a single merger in the whole 
sample period. In 212 out of 729 ordered country pairs (29%), we do not observe any merger 
activity. Missing activity points towards a potential selection bias, where firms from particular 
countries self-select into a sample of „merger-active countries‟. This is consistent with the literature, 
which shows that cross-border M&As are not random, but depend on many macroeconomic and 
institutional factors both in the target and acquiror country (Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Bris et al. 2008; 
Weitzel and Berns, 2006; Erel et al., 2012; Rossi and Volpin, 2004). For example, acquirors from 
Bulgaria only merge with targets in six foreign countries. All other country pairs with Bulgaria as 
acquiror self-select into a group without observed mergers. According to the literature, we cannot 
exclude that unobserved macroeconomic or institutional factors have to exceed a particular 
threshold before a country is observed as acquiror country in a specific country pair. Particularly in 
times of crisis, countries that are in financial distress may be unobserved as acquirors, effectively 
biasing the sample towards non-crisis countries. To correct for this potential selection effect, we 
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estimate a Heckman model (Heckman, 1979). In a first step, we estimate with maximum likelihood 
whether a particular country pair is actively merging or not using the following selection equation. 
ZTA,t =α+wA,t 'β+εTA,t  (1) 
 We use an indicator variable for merger activity defined as Z=1 if Z*TA,t>0 and Z=0 
otherwise. Z*TA,t is a latent variable for an ordered country pair with target T and acquiror A in 
quarter t. It reflects the propensity to be included in the merger sample. The vector wA,t contains k 
covariates with macro-economic and institutional factors of the acquiring country which potentially 
affect the propensity to become an acquiror of foreign targets. The logic behind this is that, for firms 
to go abroad, the acquiror country needs to offer a sufficient set of supporting characteristics as 
captured in the selection equation (1). If this condition is met, both acquiror and target country 
characteristics determine the specific direction and magnitude of merger activity in the outcome 
equation specified below.
6
 The main results of this paper are also robust to the additional inclusion 
of corresponding target country covariates (wT,t). β is a vector of coefficients and εTA,t a random 
disturbance for the selection equation.  
 In a second step, we estimate the following outcome equation, where YTA,t represents one of 
the two dependent variables, either the proportion of cross-border mergers in a country pair or the 
target premium. 
YTA,t =γ+xTA,t 'δ+uTA,t  (2) 
 Country-pair specific macro-economic, institutional, financial, and deal-related variables 
refer to the vector xTA,t. Section 3 provides detailed definitions of these variables. δ is a vector of 
coefficients and uTA,t a random disturbance for the outcome equation. 
 
3.3 Methodological challenge #2: Merger cycles 
Figure 1 depicts the total number of M&A deals in Europe from 1999 to 2012, which exhibit a 
cyclical pattern. The period includes the peak of the fifth merger wave in 2000, the subsequent burst 
                                                 
6
 Baker et al.‟s (2009) cheap financial capital hypothesis uses a similar argument. 
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of the „internet bubble‟, and the complete sixth merger wave from 2004 to 2007. There is a clear 
decline in total and in cross-border M&A activity after the start of the financial crisis.  
=== INCLUDE FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE === 
 Establishing definitive evidence of fire sales in cyclical markets is challenging, because 
clustering of cross-border M&As coincides with similar patterns in domestic activity. The ratio of 
cross-border deals to total deals fluctuates around 25% before the crisis and then drops to around 
20% from 2008 to 2012. Moreover, even if a change in FDI in crisis countries seems pronounced 
relative to pre-crisis levels of the same country, it may be less considerable when viewed against the 
general backdrop of the European M&A cycle. Previous literature often de-trended M&A activity; 
however, most approaches are crude such as being above or below a five-year average (Bouwman 
et al., 2009). We follow a more sophisticated approach and correct M&A activity between country 
pairs for the European merger wave. In doing so, we estimate the cyclical component with a 
trigonometric regression of M&A waves that allow for higher order polynomials, to ensure that 
boundary conditions are fulfilled (Cox 2006; Eubank and Speckman, 1990; Popinski, 1999). 
Specifically, if merger activity mt exhibits waves captured in the term μ(t), then 
mt =μ(t )+εt  
where μ(t) has the following general form. 
(3) 
m t( )=b0 + bjt
j
j=1
d
å + c jcos jt( )+s jsin jt( )( )
j=1
l
å  
(4) 
 The cyclical component μ(t) consists of an intercept b0, a polynomial trend (the terms bjt
j
 
where t refers to the time dimension), and cycles captured by the Fourier series cjcos(jt)+sjsin(jt). 
Using standard methods to specify the model (4) based on information criteria (SBIC, Akaike), the 
optimal number of cycles is four with different periodicity (one to four years) and the non-linear 
time trend has order four. We then estimate the M&A activity between ordered country pairs with 
the trigonometric regression (4). Figure 2 plots the annual activity of all cross-border M&As labeled 
mt and the fitted values mt* of the trigonometric regression (4).  
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=== INCLUDE FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE === 
 Figure 2 confirms that the trigonometric specification of order four exhibits a good fit. 
Consequently, we extract the four cycles from the trigonometric regression, which the model 
identifies with different frequency. Figure 3 shows only three of the cycles, for better display, 
including the very long-term and short-term cycle.  
=== INCLUDE FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE === 
 The total underlying cyclical component Ct is computed as the sum of the four cyclical 
components, which represents a Fourier series. Finally, we correct M&A activity between country 
pairs by dividing the cross-border activity YTA,t with the total cyclical component Ct, normalized 
over the range of Ct. 
YTA,t
C =
YTA,t
Ct -min Ct( )
max Ct( )-min Ct( )
+1
 
(5) 
 Hence, the higher the European merge cycle Ct, the lower weighs a surge in mergers 
between a specific country pair YTA,t, because the increase in YTA,t is less likely to be driven by 
country-specific determinants. If the European merger cycle is at its minimum, the de-cycled 
merger activity between a country pair is Y
C
TA,t = YTA,t. If mergers between a country pair increase, 
but together with a European merger wave, then Y
C
TA,t < YTA,t. In an alternative econometric 
specification, we use the unadjusted merger activity YTA,t as the dependent and use Ct as a control 
variable in both the selection and the outcome equation of the Heckman model. The results reported 
in this paper are valid for both specifications. For brevity, we report the results for the de-cycled 
dependent Y
C
TA,t only. 
 
4. Variables 
4.1 Dependent variables 
(a) Merger activity (YTA,t): Our aim is to measure the propensity of firms from one country to 
acquire firms from another country, particularly if the latter experienced severe problems during the 
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financial crisis. Following Erel et al. (2012), our dependent variable measures the proportion of 
cross-border mergers between a country pair (XTA,t) in a specific quarter t as a percentage of both 
the number of domestic mergers in the target country (XT,t) and the number of cross-border mergers 
between the country pair (XTA,t). Hence, the dependent variable YTA,t (before de-cycling), which we 
referred to in the preceding section, is defined as YTA,t=XTA,t/(XTA,t+XT,t). A higher value of YTA,t 
means that the amount of cross-border takeovers in a target country from a certain acquiring 
country has increased relative to the number of domestic deals. Obviously, YTA,t is in the range 0 to 
1. The inclusion of both domestic and cross-border deals in the denominator allows us to control for 
factors that influence both types of M&A activity.
7
 
 (b) Target premium: The target premium is the final price (F) per ordinary share offered by 
the acquiror divided by the target‟s stand-alone share price (P) one week before the first 
announcement of the merger. The variable is provided by the Thomson Reuters SDC database and 
refers to a percentage measure (F/P-1)100, which is zero if the final price is equal to the pre-
announcement market value of the target. For each country-pair, we take the average target 
premium per quarter.
8
 
 
4.2 Independent variables 
(a) Crisis period: The dummy variable is equal to one for the period from 2008 to 2012 and zero 
otherwise. There are two key moments, dependent on the region of interest, which can be 
considered as the start of the crisis. In the US, the first signs of the crisis were publicly recognizable 
in mid-2007. In June, Bear Stearns supported two failing hedge funds and then disclosed in July 
2007 that they had lost almost all their value. Subsequently, three big credit rating agencies 
downgraded several mortgage products and interest rate spreads went up as of August 2007 (Mizen, 
2008). Although the global implications of these events were not clear at first, the financial crisis 
                                                 
7
 This approach follows Erel et al. (2012), Ferreira et al. (2009) and Rossi and Volpin (2004). 
8
 For robustness, we also computed target premiums with stand-alone share prices one day or four weeks prior to the 
merger announcement. The results remain qualitatively intact. We only report the results for the one-week measure. 
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fully reached Europe and other parts of the world with the filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection of Lehman Brothers in September 15, 2008. For our analyses, we take the middle point 
of these two dates (2008q1) as the first „crisis quarter‟ in Europe.9 
 (b) Crisis countries: Following Beetsma et al. (2013) as well as Kalbaska and Gatkowski 
(2012), we dummy the following target countries as crisis countries in the EU: Portugal, Italy, 
Greece and Spain are grouped together in the dummy „Crisis countries (T,4)‟. The dummy „Crisis 
countries (T,5)‟ also includes Ireland. All five countries experienced severe problems during the 
crisis and were partly excluded from capital markets (Beetsma et al., 2013).  
 (c) Alternative crisis country proxies: A dichotomous dummy variable for certain crisis 
countries, or a group of crisis countries, cannot capture gradual differences in financial distress 
within and between countries. We therefore also compute six continuous and time-varying variables 
as alternative proxies for a country‟s economic and financial situation: two variables for economic 
risk, two for (potential) economic demand, and two for macroeconomic liquidity. For each of these 
variables, we gathered data on a monthly basis which we converted to quarterly data by taking 
simple averages. We then compute the difference between the target and the acquiror country by 
subtracting the value of the acquiror country from the corresponding value of the target country.
10
 
Hence a high value indicates that the target country scores higher than the acquiror. To ensure weak 
endogeneity, all variables are lagged by one quarter unless stated otherwise. 
 Yield, souv. bond (T-A): The first proxy for macro-economic risk is the harmonized 10-year 
government bond yield (source: Datastream/Eurostat). A higher yield indicates higher sovereign 
default risk. In case of missing values, we turn to the long-term government bond yield (source: 
Datastream/International Financial Statistics).
11
 
 Rating, Moody's (T-A): The second proxy for macro-economic risk is the long term 
                                                 
9
 The results of this paper do not depend on this specific date. The reported results remain intact if we use crisis 
dummies starting in 2007q3 or in 2008q3. 
10
 We indicate this by adding „(T-A)‟ to the variable name. 
11
 We also tried to compute the spread on sovereign credit default swaps (CDS). Unfortunately, CDS data is only 
available since 2007 for most countries. 
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sovereign credit rating issued by Moody‟s Investors Service. To be able to use credit ratings for a 
quantitative analysis, we follow Cantor and Packer (1997) and assign numerical values for each 
rating (e.g. AAA is coded as 1, Aa1 as 2). A higher value indicates a lower rating.
12
 
 Economic sentiment (T-A): The first proxy for economic demand is the economic sentiment. 
The data are compiled by the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) 
and consist of five components: industrial confidence (40%), services confidence (30%), consumer 
confidence (20%), construction (5%), and retail trade (5%). This value fluctuates around a level of 
100, where a higher value indicates more confidence in the future economic development.
13
 
 Household fin. sit. (T-A): The second proxy for economic demand is an index for the 
financial situation of private households, which is compiled by the DG ECFIN on the basis of a 
survey. A high value indicates a better financial situation.  
 Domestic credit (T-A): The first proxy for macro-economic liquidity of a target country is a 
measure of the total of resources provided to the private sector, as percent of GDP (source: World 
Bank). These resources are not limited to credit or loans by the banking sector (also see below). The 
variable is only available on a yearly basis and is lagged by one year. 
 Domestic credit banking (T-A): The second proxy for macroeconomic liquidity is a measure 
of all credit provided by the banking sector to various sectors in the economy. The amount of credit 
is expressed as a percent of GDP (source: World Bank). The variable is only available on a yearly 
basis and is lagged by one year. 
 
4.3 Control variables 
We use control variables for differences in (i) the economic and financial situation of a country pair, 
(ii) institutional differences, and (iii) for deal-specific characteristics, averaged per quarter. The 
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 We also computed Moody‟s Rating where the watchlist is taken into account. The watchlist states whether a rating is 
under review (Keenan et al., 1998). If a sovereign is placed on review for downgrade, a half-point is added to its 
numerical rating, while a half-point is deducted when a sovereign is placed on review for upgrade. However, the 
reported results for „Rating, Moody's (T-A)‟ do not change when we consider the watchlist. 
13
 As industrial confidence is the most important component in the economic sentiment index, we ran robustness checks 
with the industrial confidence index on its one. The reported results do not change qualitatively. 
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choice of control variables is based on similar specifications in the pertinent cross-border M&A 
literature (e.g., Erel et al., 2012; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Kling et al., 2013). All variables with „(T-
A)‟ are differences between target and acquiror countries (target minus acquiror values; used in the 
outcome equations). Variables with „(T)‟ or „(A)‟ only apply to the target or acquiror country (used 
in the selection equation), respectively. With the exception of (iii), all time-varying variables are 
lagged by one period. 
   
4.3.1 Economic and financial control variables 
We include the annual GDP per capita in US$ at constant prices (GDP/CAP (T-A); source: World 
Bank). To reduce the effect of outliers, we compute the natural logarithm. To account for the degree 
of stock market development, we measure the market capitalization as percent of GDP (MKTCAP 
(T-A)). Market capitalization equals the share price times the number of shares outstanding (source: 
World Bank). Year-on-year growth rates of GDP in current US$ (source: World Bank) are deflated 
with the year-on-year change of the US Consumer Price Index (source: Datastream) (GDP growth 
(T-A)). The total of imports and exports as a percentage of a country‟s GDP per year proxies the 
openness of the economy (source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database) (Openness 
(T-A)).
14
 To capture stock market valuation, we determined the quarterly value-weighted ratio 
between the market and book values for all listed companies per country (Market-to-book (T-A)). In 
Datastream, we selected all companies on a country‟s main exchange and downloaded companies‟ 
market values and market-to-book ratios. We winsorized all values at the 1 and 99 percentile at 
country-year level to correct for outliers. The difference in the quarterly nominal return on the local 
stock market index between acquiror and target country indicates relative performance (Stock 
market return (T-A)) (source: Datastream). We resorted to a Datastream index if there is no official 
index available. In case there is neither an official index nor a Datastream index, we used either an 
MSCI or an S&P country index. To account for risk, we used the standard deviation of the local 
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 Not all import and export figures for 2011 were published. If missing, we used the 2010 values for 2011 as well. 
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stock market (S.D. stock market return (T-A)). We calculated the quarterly standard deviation based 
on monthly returns of each country‟s stock market in local currency (source: Datastream). To 
determine the real appreciation of a country‟s currency, we first calculated the nominal appreciation 
versus US$ for each currency and quarter (Currency appreciation (T-A); source: Datastream/ 
WM/Reuters). We then deflated the nominal appreciation by the difference in CPI between the 
country and the US (source: Datastream/Eurostat).
15
 As a last step, we deducted the real 
appreciation of the target country‟s currency against the US dollar from the acquiror country‟s 
corresponding value. 
 
4.3.2 Institutional control variables: 
The governance indicator (Governance index (T-A)) from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
dataset measures the governance quality on six different dimensions: voice and accountability, 
political stability and lack of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
control of corruption. We averaged the outcomes across the six variables for each country. We 
interpolated linearly between years in case of missing values. We used the total tax rate as reported 
by the World Bank (Tax rate (T-A)). This annual rate measures “the amount of taxes and mandatory 
contributions payable by businesses after accounting for allowable deductions and exemptions as a 
share of commercial profits”.16 We used Stulz and Williamson (2003) data on language for most 
countries (Same language (T-A)). If data were missing, we resorted to the Language Database 
(http://www.language-database.com).
17
 Given that most countries in Europe have different 
languages, we coded the language group for each language. We create a dummy LANGUAGE 
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 Suppose the appreciation of country A‟s currency versus the US dollar is 4% in a certain year. In the same year, A 
experiences an inflation rate of 5% while the US inflation is 2% in that year. The real appreciation of country A‟s 
currency is then 4 – (5 – 2) = 4 – 5 +2 = 1%. Note that this variable includes two effects. First, it proxies member 
countries of the Eurozone where the difference in appreciation is always zero and, second, it captures currency 
appreciation effects for non-Eurozone countries. In unreported robustness checks we additionally included a separate 
indicator variable for Eurozone countries. All results reported in this paper remain qualitatively unchanged. The results 
of the robustness checks can be requested from the authors. 
16
 Data is available as of 2005. Given the fairly constant nature of tax rates, we apply the 2005 numbers also to the 
years 1999 – 2004. 
17
 Luxembourgish is absent on this website. We used Wikipedia to find that this language belongs to the Germanic 
language group. 
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which takes value one if both countries share the same language group and zero otherwise. A 
commonly used cultural variable is religious proximity (see, e.g., Erel at al. 2012). We therefore 
compute a dummy equal to one if the primary religion of the acquiror and target country is identical 
(Same religion (T-A)). Given the limited heterogeneity in Europe, for 16 countries are primarily 
Catholic and seven are Protestant, we also used the difference in religiosity between countries. 
Religiosity is defined as the percentage of inhabitants in a certain country who believe that there is a 
God (Population ratio believers (T-A)). The data refer to the Special Eurobarometer issued by the 
European Commission (2005).
18
 Finally, the composition of the EU has changed several times since 
1999. Particularly, the EU welcomed several new entrants. To account for these changes in the 
composition of the EU, we computed the dummy EU_NEW. This variable takes the value one for 
countries which have entered the EU after 1999. 
 
4.3.3 Deal-specific control variables: 
All deal-specific control variables refer to SDC. We controlled for the number of mergers where 
cash was the only means of payment, expressed as a fraction of all mergers per country pair and 
quarter (Ratio all-cash deals). The variable „Ratio horizontal deals’ refers to the number of mergers 
where the target and the acquiror are in the same industry (four-digit SIC), expressed as a fraction 
of all mergers per country pair and quarter. We account for the following deal-specific factors: (a) 
the number of mergers that are withdrawn before completion, expressed as a fraction of all mergers 
per country pair and quarter (Ratio withdrawn deals); (b) the number of mergers with a public 
acquiror, expressed as a fraction of all mergers per country pair and quarter (Ratio public acquiror); 
(c) the number of friendly mergers, expressed as a fraction of all mergers per country pair and 
quarter (Ratio friendly deals); (d) the number of mergers where the target is privatized expressed as 
a fraction of all mergers per country pair and quarter (Ratio privatization); and (e) the number of 
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 A popular alternative measure for cultural proximity is the geodesic distance between capital cities. In unreported 
robustness checks we included this measure in addition to the variables that pertain to language, religion and 
governance. All results reported in this paper remain qualitatively unchanged. The results of the robustness checks 
can be requested from the authors. 
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mergers where acquiror makes a tender offer, expressed as a fraction of all mergers per country pair 
and quarter (Ratio tender offers). 
 
4.4 Variable description 
Table 2 reports summary statistics and Pearson coefficients of pairwise correlations between all 
variables in the outcome equation. The first two variables of the table (dependents) show that on 
average cross-border mergers constitute 12.9% of all mergers in the sample while the average bid 
premium is 23.6%. The summary statistics for variables (3) to (15) refer to differences (or 
similarities) between target and acquirer nations (target minus acquiror value). Additional bid 
characteristics are depicted in variables (16) to (22). 8.3% of all deals were financed entirely in 
cash, while 41% of the deals were horizontal, and only 1.3% of all announced deals were 
withdrawn before consummation. 43.1% of the mergers involved a publicly listed acquirer. The 
large majority of deals (92.9%) were of a friendly nature. Both privatizations and tender offers 
accounted for a small fraction of all deals; 2.4% and 2%, respectively. Finally, variables (23) to (28) 
represent additional crisis proxies (next to the dummies for the crisis period and for typical crisis 
countries). The raw averages indicate that sovereign bond yields for target countries are higher than 
for acquirer countries. In line with this, target countries usually have a lower credit rating indicated 
by a positive mean (credit rating is coded on an inverse scale). Economic sentiment, household 
financial situation, credit supplied to the private sector, and credit supplied by the financial sector 
are all lower, on average, in the target country vis-à-vis the acquiring country. 
In Table 2, all pairwise correlations above 0.0276 are statistically significant at the 1% level, 
except correlations with „target premium‟, where all values above 0.0838 are statistically significant 
at the 1% level. A Variance inflation factor (VIF) test of the baseline specification (Model A3, see 
next section) indicates no problems of multicollinearity. The mean VIF is 1.54 and the variable with 
the highest VIF, ‘Governance index (T-A)’ has a value of 4.53, which is still well below 5.3, the cut-
off point according to Hair et al. (1992) or even 10, the cut-off according to Belsley et al. (1980) 
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and Studenmund (1992). Despite the acceptable values of the VIF test, Table 2 indicates a couple of 
high correlations above 0.5. ‘GDP/CAP (T-A)’ and ‘MKTCAP (T-A)’ are highly correlated with the 
control variable ‘Governance index (T-A)’. Rerunning all estimations without ‘Governance index 
(T-A)’ shows that the results are robust. 
=== INCLUDE TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE === 
 Table 2 also reveals a high correlation between some of the crisis proxies, e.g., between 
„Yield, souv. bond (T-A)’ and ‘Rating, Moody’s (T-A)’. This is not surprising, as these proxies are 
meant to be alternative measurements of the same characteristic, i.e., sovereign default risk. We 
therefore analyze these proxies individually and in separate model specifications. Despite these 
remedies, multicollinearity may still arise as a methodological challenge, because ‘GDP/CAP (T-A)’ 
and to a lesser extent ‘MKTCAP (T-A)’ are also highly correlated with almost all continuous crisis 
proxies. As these are our variables of interest, we cannot simply exclude them from the 
specification for robustness checks. To address this issue we create a set of dummy variables for 
‘GDP/CAP (T-A)’ and ‘MKTCAP (T-A)’ whose threshold levels are not theory-driven; rather we 
take an empirical approach. We chose the highest quintile as a reference category dummy. With 
quintiles as cut off points the reference dummy is highly correlated with all other independent 
variables. This procedure ensures that the reference dummy absorbs much of the multicollinearity 
so that remaining dummies are less related to other independent variables. As the reference category 
dummy is excluded from regressions, multicollinearity is not a serious issue anymore. 
 
5. Results 
To analyze whether fire-sale FDI played a role in European countries that experienced a financial 
and economic crisis, we study merger activity (quantity of firms sold) and target premiums paid 
(selling prices) before and during the crisis in non-crisis and crisis countries. By interacting crisis 
period dummies with proxies for crisis countries, we can test whether more corporate assets were 
fire-sold during the crisis by crisis countries. 
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5.1 Merger activity 
As explained in the methods section, we use a multivariate regression framework with a Heckman 
approach to correct for possible selection biases. All standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering within country pairs. In all estimations, we also include period 
fixed effects for year-quarters, although we do not report them in tables. 
 We start with the analysis of two simple dichotomous variables: a dummy for the crisis 
period and a dummy for crisis countries. Table 3 reports the results of the outcome equation of the 
Heckman estimation. Model A1 introduces all macroeconomic control variables, while all deal-
specific control variables are added in Model A2. As already indicated in Figure 1, the negative and 
statistically significant coefficient for ‘Crisis period’ shows that the proportion of cross-border 
mergers dropped after the start of the crisis in 2008. The dummy for the four crisis countries 
Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain shows a generally higher level of cross-border activity compared 
with non-crisis countries.  
=== INCLUDE TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE === 
 Note that the positive relation between ‘Crisis countries (T,4)’ and cross-border mergers 
applies to the whole period and not only to the crisis period. Moreover, the statistical significance 
weakens as more controls are added in Model A2. Using individual country dummies in Model A3 
and A4 shows that the positive correlation is not robust. It only weakly holds for Portugal and 
Greece (p<0.1), but not for Italy, Spain (Model A3), or Ireland (Model A4). When all five crisis 
countries including Ireland are combined into a single dummy, its coefficient is insignificant when 
included individually (analogue to Model A2; unreported). 
 In Model A5 and A6, we investigate the interaction between the crisis period and the crisis 
country dummies. The fire-sale hypothesis would predict a positive interaction coefficient, more 
sales by crisis countries in times of crisis, which we do not find, however; neither for the group of 
four nor for the five crisis countries (Model A5 and Model A6, respectively). The base effect of the 
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interaction for the crisis countries is only significant in Model A6 but not in A5. Hence, when using 
a group dummy, we do not reliably detect a higher share of cross-border merger activity in crisis 
countries, neither over the whole period nor during the crisis. Although this result does not provide 
strong support for the fire-sales hypothesis, there is also no clear evidence against it, which would 
be a pronounced drop of foreign investments in crisis countries in times of crisis. In fact, we do not 
find any negative and statistically significant interaction effect in Models A5 and A6. 
 The coefficients of the control variables in Models A1 to A6 are consistent across all 
specifications and in line with prior literature. Target countries are less or equally wealthy and 
financially developed than acquiror countries, which can be seen from the dummies for the quintiles 
for GDP per capita and financial market capitalization (the 5th quintile is the lowest). Investments 
in target countries also increase with higher GDP growth, more openness of the economy, lower 
market-to-book ratios, lower stock market returns, lower (higher) currency appreciation 
(depreciation), same language and religion, and lower tax rates. All findings are consistent with 
previous literature on cross-border M&As (e.g., Erel et al., 2012; Rossi and Volpin, 2004). The 
negative relationship with the ratio of targets that are privatized can be explained by the fact that a 
high privatization ratio may proxy historically more regulated and less open economies. A 
robustness check without this control variable does not produce qualitatively different results. 
 The results of the corresponding selection equation to the outcome equation in Table 3 are 
reported in Table 3s in the appendix. As we can see in Table 3s the hypothesis that rho=0 is rejected 
with a high statistical significance of p<0.001. As rho measures the correlation between the error 
terms of the selection and of the outcome equation, a positive rho means that the selection into the 
outcome equation is not a random process and that we should correct the coefficient estimates in 
Table 3 with the proposed Heckman correction model. The statistically more significant results of 
the selection equation in Table 3s (p<0.05) show that acquirors have a higher propensity to invest in 
cross-border deals when they come from high tax countries, with high market-to-book ratios, high 
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currency appreciation and less volatile financial markets (low ‘S.D. stock market return (A)’).19 This 
is consistent with previous literature on the determinants of cross-border mergers (e.g., Erel et al., 
2012; Rossi and Volpin, 2004) and with the notion of multinationals as cross-border arbitrageurs of 
relatively cheap capital (Baker et al., 2009). 
 As mentioned in section 3, a dummy variable for a group of crisis countries is a blunt proxy 
as it is not able to capture gradual differences in economic conditions. In Table 4, we therefore 
analyze six time-varying and continuous variables as alternative proxies for a target country's 
economic and financial distress. 
=== INCLUDE TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE === 
 Model C1 and C2 include sovereign bond yields (‘Yield, souv. bond (T-A)’) and Moody's 
sovereign credit rating (‘Rating, Moody's (T-A)’) as two variables for country risk. Note that the 
values of both variables increase in risk. The variable ‘Crisis period interaction’ reports the 
coefficients of the interaction effect of the respective proxy for a target country‟s distress with the 
dummy ‘Crisis period’. According to the fire-sale hypothesis, a country with higher default risk 
should attract more foreign buyers in times of crisis. And indeed, for both country risk variables we 
find a significant positive interaction effect for the variable ‘Crisis period interaction’. Hence, both, 
sovereign bond yields and credit ratings provide evidence for the fire-sale hypothesis. Countries 
with higher default risk attract a higher proportion of cross-border mergers in times of crisis. 
 The positive base effect of ‘Rating, Moody's (T-A)’ in Model C2 indicates that countries with 
higher risk also attracted more foreign buyers before 2008. This indicates a generally attractive risk 
return trade-off, which is even stronger in times of crisis. For sovereign bond yields in Model C1 
the base effect is negative, but only in combination with the interaction effect. If the interaction 
variable ‘Crisis period interaction’ is dropped from Model C1 (unreported), the overall effect of 
‘Yield, souv. bond (T-A)’ is positive and significant (p<0.05). 
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 Acquirors are also less likely to originate from countries with high openness. One reason might be that „Openness (T-
A)‟ is negatively correlated with „GDP/CAP (T-A)‟, „MKTCAP (T-A)‟, and positively correlated with „GDP growth (T-
A)‟ (see Table 2). Hence, openness may partially proxy less wealthy and developed economies with more growth 
potential, which are typically target countries and not acquirors. 
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 Model C3 and C4 introduce two variables for (potential) economic demand: economic 
sentiment and the financial situation of private households. According to the fire-sale hypothesis, 
we expect that in times of crisis target countries with a particularly low economic sentiment or 
financial strength of households receive a higher proportion of cross-border mergers. We therefore 
expect a negative interaction effect of the economic demand proxies with the ‘Crisis dummy’. In 
line with this prediction, we find a negative and statistically significant coefficient for the variable 
‘Crisis period interaction’ in both Models C3 and C4. Yet, the base effects for ‘Economic sentiment 
(T-A)’ and ‘Household fin. sit. (T-A)’ are positive and significant. Also, when we drop the variable 
‘Crisis period interaction’ from Models C3 and C4 (unreported), the overall effect of both 
economic demand proxies is positive (p<0.05 and p<0.1, respectively). Hence, in general, cross-
border acquirors seek targets in countries with high economic demand, but in times of crisis, target 
countries with particularly low economic sentiment and household finance become attractive, in 
line with the fire-sale hypothesis.
20
 
 Model C4 and C5 include two variables for macro-economic liquidity: domestic credit 
provided to the private sector (‘Domestic credit (T-A)’) and domestic credit provided by the banking 
sector (‘Dom. credit banking (T-A)’). These are particularly interesting variables, as the fire-sale 
hypothesis argues that a shortage of domestic liquidity forces local owners to sell their firms to 
foreign buyers with superior access to liquidity (Krugman, 2000). We therefore expect a negative 
coefficient of the interaction variable ‘Crisis period interaction’ in both Models C4 and C5. The 
results, however, show exactly the opposite effect. Countries with lower (higher) domestic credit 
attract a lower (higher) proportion of cross-border mergers during the crisis years. The base effect 
for ‘Domestic credit banking (T-A)’ in Model C6 is weakly negative, but this effect becomes 
statistically insignificant when the variable 'Crisis period interaction' is dropped from the model 
(unreported). 
 Hence, on the one hand, we do find evidence consistent with the fire-sale hypothesis for 
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 We also find similar results for industrial confidence, which is one component of „Economic sentiment (T-A)‟. 
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countries with higher default risk and lower economic demand in the crisis. On the other hand, for 
countries with lower domestic credit, which provide the most important „test bed‟ for the fire-sale 
hypothesis, the results are in conflict with the notion of a sell-out of corporate assets in times of a 
shortage of liquidity. A brief look at all other variables in Table 4 does not reveal any surprises. The 
base effect of the crisis period dummy is consistently negative across all models, as expected, and 
all control variables exhibit a qualitatively similar behavior as in Table 3. 
 Finally, we inspect the results of the selection equation in Table 4s in the appendix. Again, 
most effects are similar to Table 3s and the test for independent equations (H0: rho=0) is rejected 
and therefore confirms that a Heckman selection approach is appropriate. The effects of the 
domestic credit proxies in the selection equation (Models C5 and C6 of Table 4s) are, however, 
interesting. The positive and significant coefficients in both models show that acquirors are more 
likely to originate from countries with higher domestic credit. This is in line with the notion of fire-
sale FDI, where acquirors have access to foreign (home-country) liquidity. This evidence is also 
consistent, however, with the „cheap financial capital hypothesis‟ of Baker et al. (2009), which 
suggests that multinationals use FDI as a financial capital channel from acquiror countries with 
relatively low-cost capital. 
 
5.2 Target premium 
The following investigation of target premiums complements the analysis of merger activity 
(quantity of firms sold) from the perspective of selling prices. Unfortunately, the data for target 
premiums are mostly limited to public targets. We therefore have only 910 non-missing 
observations at the country-pair and quarter level in the outcome equation, while there are 34,330 
observations in the selection equation. In addition, the test for the independence of the selection and 
the outcome equations cannot reject the null that the selection is random. The p-value that rho=0 
ranges from p=0.187 to p=0.862, depending on the model specification. Hence, a Heckman 
procedure is not needed. Accordingly, we estimate and report the outcome equation directly using 
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General Least Squares (GLS) panel regressions.
21
 We use random-effects estimators per ordered 
country pair and include period fixed effects for year-quarters, although we do not report them in 
tables. All standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
 We start with the analysis of two dummy variables for the crisis period and for a group of 
crisis countries. Table 5 reports the results of the GLS estimation. Model B1 introduces all 
macroeconomic control variables and Model B2 all deal-specific control variables. We find a strong 
negative relationship between ‘Crisis countries (T,4)’ and target premiums in these four countries. 
This applies to the whole period and, as the country break-up in Model B3 and B4 shows, also to 
each crisis country individually. The only exception is Ireland (Model B4), where targets seem to be 
equally expensive as in the rest of the EU. Although crisis countries generally have lower selling 
prices, the positive coefficient of the dummy ‘Crisis period’ indicates a tendency towards higher 
premiums in crisis years. This effect, however, is only weakly significant and not robust (see Model 
B5 and B6 in Table 5 and all models in Table 6), but we can confidently conclude that the average 
premium paid does not decrease during the crisis. 
=== INCLUDE TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE === 
 The most important test for the fire-sale hypothesis is the interaction of the crisis countries 
with the crisis period. The fire-sale hypothesis predicts that target prices drop in a crisis, often 
below their fundamental value (Krugman, 2000). As the results in Table 5 show, the respective 
interaction effects in Model B5 and B6 are not negative (Model B5 even reports a statistically weak 
positive effect). Although prices for crisis countries are generally low, they seem to remain on that 
level and do not drop to fire-sale levels during the crisis. 
 Table 6 shows six alternative proxies for the crisis country dummies in Table 5: sovereign 
risk measures (Model D1 and D2), proxies for economic demand (Model D3 and D4), as well as 
measures of domestic credit (Model D5 and D6). For each of these models, the fire-sale hypothesis 
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 For robustness, we estimated all specifications of the panel as outcome equation in a Heckman procedure, with the 
same selection equations as in Table 3s and 4s despite the fact that rho is never statistically different from zero. None of 
the reported results of the panel estimation specifications differ qualitatively. 
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would predict significant interaction effects. However, we do not find any significant interaction 
effects (see variable ‘Crisis period interaction’) in any of the models. 
=== INCLUDE TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE === 
 In Model D5 and D6, the base effect of the two domestic credit variables is positive, 
suggesting lower target prices when the target country has a low liquidity. Although, at the face of 
it, this interpretation is in line with the notion of fire-sale FDI, the base effect of domestic credit 
applies to the whole period and not only to the crisis years. In fact, the positive relationship between 
each of the two domestic credit variables and target premiums prevails when we exclude the 
interaction variables from Model D5 and D6 (p<0.1 and p<0.05; unreported). The general nature of 
this effect is not consistent with fire-sale prices in liquidity-constraint target countries during times 
of crisis. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates how the financial crisis affected the selling and buying of corporate assets 
between EU countries. Particularly, we analyze whether fire-sale FDI played a role in the financial 
crisis in Europe with a large panel of corporate transactions in 27 EU countries from 1999 to 2012.  
 We generally detect a decline in cross-border activity during the crisis. This applies to all 
countries including crisis countries such as Greece, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, and Spain. When we use 
sovereign risk measurements, macroeconomic demand conditions, and credit conditions to identify 
countries in distress, the evidence is mixed. On the one hand, for countries with higher default risk 
and lower economic demand in the crisis, the results are consistent with the fire-sale hypothesis. On 
the other hand, for countries with lower domestic credit, which provide the most important „test 
bed‟ for the fire-sale hypothesis, the results are in conflict with the notion of fire-sales. CDS spreads 
may clarify the mixed results, as they are an alternative measure (to sovereign bond spreads) for a 
country‟s default risk in the European financial crisis (Grammatikos and Vermeulen, 2012). 
Unfortunately, the data quality and coverage for CDS spreads is not sufficient for our purposes, 
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particularly in the early years of our sample and for the crisis countries.
22
 We therefore did not 
include CDS spreads, as they would have led to a severe bias of our sample. Undoubtedly, this is a 
limitation of our study.  
For target premiums paid in the five crisis countries, our results show that premiums are 
generally lower, but that they do not drop further amid the crisis. Although we find evidence for 
depressed prices if credit liquidity in the target country is low this effect is not stronger in the crisis 
period, which is not consistent with fire-sale FDI. It rather indicates that fire-sales are „business as 
usual‟ (Alquist et al., 2013) and not particularly driven by the financial crisis. Taken together, we 
find little evidence for the view that European crisis countries fire-sale their assets, which is in line 
with recent studies of Chari et al. (2010) and of Alquist et al. (2013) for emerging markets. 
Our analysis contributes to several antecedents that the literature has shown to play an 
important role in cross-border M&As. A first antecedent is the relative difference in market 
development and growth prospects. Di Giovanni (2005) shows that the ratio of financial market 
capitalization to GDP in the acquiror country is positively related to the likelihood of firms 
investing abroad. Target countries with lower GDP per capita coupled with higher GDP growth 
rates (both in relative terms) also attract more cross-border M&As (e.g., Norden and Posch, 2012). 
Our analyses confirm these findings. Differences in corporate governance and related institutions 
are a second, possible reason for cross-border M&As. Rossi and Volpin (2004) show that cross 
border M&As often involve a target operating in an environment with less shareholder protection, 
and they imply that the transferal of the same level of investor protection to the target enhances 
value. In line with this, Chari et al. (2010) contend that companies from developed countries enjoy 
stock price gains after acquiring targets that are exposed to a weaker institutional environment. 
Other evidence shows that acquirors from countries with stricter governance pay a higher premium 
for cross-border targets (Bris and Cabolis, 2008) and that targets in countries with weaker 
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 In Thomson Reuter‟s Datastream, for example, reliable coverage of sovereign CDS spreads starts between 2003 (e.g. 
Sweden, Denmark) and 2008 (Finland). 
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institutions are sold for lower prices (Weitzel and Berns, 2006).
23
 However, our results do not show 
a significant association of quality of governance with cross-border M&As. This is not surprising as 
one reason for our focus on a EU sample was to reduce confounding effects in this area (also see 
introduction). A third antecedent are differences in capital supply and valuation between the 
acquiror and target country. As explained in Section 2, FDI into crisis countries may be due to 
undervalued assets in the target country and/or cheap financial capital in the acquirer country, which 
Baker et al. (2009) refer to as cross-border capital arbitrage by multinationals. Although we find 
little evidence for the former, our results provide some hints in support of the latter. We find that 
acquirors come from countries with easier access to capital (in the form of high market-to-book 
ratios and higher currency appreciation) and that they invest in target countries with less domestic 
credit. This is in line with a number of previous studies that show that acquirors typically originate 
from countries with relatively low-cost capital (Baker et al., 2009; Erel et al., 2012). However, our 
paper does not provide a direct test of cross-border capital arbitrage within the EU, nor does it allow 
clear implications in this respect. In fact, many of our results show that the crisis had only a limited 
effect on FDI into crisis countries and on respective target prices. Hence, capital market 
imperfections in target or acquirer countries, favoring the fire-sale of cheap financial capital 
hypothesis, respectively, both seem to be attenuated by European capital market integration. We 
readily acknowledge that these are only indications, but our results indicate an interesting avenue 
for future research. 
                                                 
23
 Further, supporting evidence shows that Tobin‟s Q of the industry in which a target is active increases after a cross-
border merger (Bris et al., 2008).  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. Number of mergers per country pair from 1999 to 2012 
The column „Total‟ reports the totals only for cross-border mergers. The column „Total (%)‟ expresses the cross-border mergers for a respective country 
as a percentage of the total cross-border merger activity. 
Target: Austria Belgium Bulgaria Cyprus
Czech 
Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania
Luxem
bourg Malta
Nether
lands Poland Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden
United 
Kingdom Total Total (%)
Acquirer:
Austria 806 18 26 0 48 11 2 10 31 354 3 54 4 38 2 0 3 0 27 35 2 34 24 23 13 25 42 829 4.4%
Belgium 12 914 6 0 19 13 3 12 265 128 6 9 6 42 1 1 26 0 171 15 11 10 6 5 49 20 109 945 5.0%
Bulgaria 0 0 221 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 0.0%
Cyprus 0 0 7 120 5 2 2 1 0 6 17 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 2 5 1 13 0 0 2 2 11 79 0.4%
Czech 
Republic 3 0 5 0 558 0 1 0 2 17 0 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 10 0 3 27 2 1 2 7 90 0.5%
Denmark 15 16 5 2 12 1447 3 55 46 118 1 6 7 30 6 25 1 0 51 40 4 7 4 1 37 232 99 823 4.3%
Estonia 0 0 1 0 1 1 170 15 1 0 3 1 0 0 23 22 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 71 0.4%
Finland 15 17 1 0 18 52 74 2078 35 140 1 12 5 32 22 31 0 1 53 44 1 5 10 3 17 284 60 933 4.9%
France 31 249 13 2 61 49 4 26 7593 418 20 31 31 218 4 4 24 2 185 99 52 32 11 5 309 87 472 2439 12.8%
Germany 336 132 23 3 123 110 6 61 380 8562 16 66 23 214 8 11 27 1 302 126 15 33 26 12 155 158 448 2815 14.8%
Greece 6 6 33 37 3 3 0 2 8 19 997 10 3 13 0 0 1 0 9 8 1 30 2 0 15 6 20 235 1.2%
Hungary 4 0 7 0 14 0 0 1 3 5 0 374 0 3 0 1 0 0 1 15 2 14 6 1 0 0 2 79 0.4%
Ireland 8 22 5 0 4 11 1 8 26 34 0 6 555 9 2 0 0 0 37 7 3 1 3 0 6 19 374 586 3.1%
Italy 25 25 12 0 22 5 2 14 189 176 17 13 6 3053 4 3 7 1 43 33 16 21 7 4 140 32 137 954 5.0%
Latvia 0 1 0 1 0 0 13 2 1 3 0 0 0 0 100 13 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 38 0.2%
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 3 12 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 14 158 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 5 1 45 0.2%
Luxembourg 8 14 5 0 7 9 1 3 43 70 4 4 1 22 0 1 28 0 23 23 3 5 4 0 12 12 30 304 1.6%
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 16 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 3 12 0.1%
Netherlands 34 243 13 4 53 58 5 40 199 403 16 34 27 102 9 7 15 2 2695 58 27 32 13 4 138 84 304 1924 10.1%
Poland 5 1 5 3 32 6 2 2 4 30 0 11 3 5 1 24 1 0 5 1534 0 13 8 0 11 4 4 180 0.9%
Portugal 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 12 12 2 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 1 4 663 1 0 0 102 0 11 156 0.8%
Romania 1 0 3 1 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 225 3 0 3 0 4 28 0.1%
Slovakia 3 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53 1 2 0 0 33 0.2%
Slovenia 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 6 1 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 2 171 2 1 2 31 0.2%
Spain 7 13 2 0 18 8 0 18 151 78 4 3 6 80 0 3 5 0 33 28 135 2 2 0 4255 9 67 672 3.5%
Sweden 22 44 7 2 36 304 49 334 135 194 7 14 15 51 27 29 8 4 104 63 9 9 8 9 56 3825 245 1785 9.4%
United 
Kingdom 45 115 16 9 55 104 8 65 453 570 21 34 293 202 6 6 10 4 287 83 47 35 15 3 234 211 16284 2931 15.4%
Total 585 918 195 64 555 749 188 671 1990 2784 140 327 433 1080 131 182 128 15 1339 707 330 302 184 73 1304 1197 2453
Total (%) 3.1% 4.8% 1.0% 0.3% 2.9% 3.9% 1.0% 3.5% 10.5% 14.6% 0.7% 1.7% 2.3% 5.7% 0.7% 1.0% 0.7% 0.1% 7.0% 3.7% 1.7% 1.6% 1.0% 0.4% 6.9% 6.3% 12.9%  
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Figure 1. Cross-border and domestic M&As in the EU from 1999 to 2012 
Number of M&A transactions in the EU per quarter split into the number of cross-border deals 
within the EU, number of total deals in the EU, and the percentage of cross-border deals. We 
included all countries that are part of the EU as of 2012 for each year. 
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Figure 2. Actual number of cross-border M&As and fitted values 
Fitted values refer to the trigonometric regression as shown in equation (4) using an optimal number 
of cycles and non-linear time trend. 
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Figure 3. Illustration of three cyclical components 
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Table 3s: Selection equation results for Table 3 
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Table 4s: Selection equation results for Table 4 
 
